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Available online 17 June 2005We are pleased to respond to this JBI panel on our
recent article in JAMA. In David Batess words, and
as noted by others here, the article in JAMA ‘‘generated
a tremendous amount of attention and discussion within
the informatics community.’’ In writing that article—
part of a 5-year study across at least two computerized
physician order entry (CPOE) systems—our primary in-
tent was to expand analyses of CPOE systems to include
a range of research methods and research foci. The
Bates quote is also a useful starting point because the de-
bate within the informatics community has been generally
thoughtful and constructive, with many saying, in eﬀect,
‘‘weve known this for years. . . Koppel et al.s major
contribution was in demonstrating it clearly and with
good data.’’ This is a stark contrast to the press releases
and articles by healthcare IT developers and others who
mistakenly believe we are opposed to the use of CPOE.
Bates notes that we evaluated a vendor-developed/
vendor-built system, the predominant type in US hospi-
tals, whereas several well-known CPOE system studies
were based on home-grown applications tailored to the
institution at hand. This useful distinction might explain
some of the diﬀerences between our ﬁndings and those
of other scholars because the constant re-evaluation,
on-site research, and responsiveness needed for good
CPOE systems are more likely to be found in the1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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responsiveness is exactly what we called for. As Bates
indicates, after the initial installation of the home-grown
CPOE system at his institution, they routinely tracked
errors and problems and made thousands of changes
to the program, but ‘‘it is just impossible to get it all
right at the outset, because the processes involved are
so complex.’’ However, it is the vendor-developed/ven-
dor-built systems that are being installed nationwide,
generally in institutions with markedly lower capability
to adapt them than a large teaching hospital like ours.
As Bates noted, the system in our study was devel-
oped years ago, although it has undergone innumerable
improvements, including many since it was installed in
1997. In any event, the birthday of the system does
not negate the reality that it represents a widely used sys-
tem, and is not a historical artifact from the 1990s or
earlier. More critical, as Bates acknowledges, the ability
of any new system to address the concerns raised in our
article requires empirical investigation. Our articles pri-
mary foci were on the methodologies of examining er-
rors (e.g., interviews, focus groups, shadowing, and
surveys) and on the problems of systems integration,
clinical and organizational workﬂow, unanticipated
responses (side eﬀects) to enhancements, and human–
machine interfaces. The research should go beyond
counting errors via direct observation. However, it does
not negate studies of counting errors—these are answers
to diﬀerent questions.
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our article will slow the adoption rate of CPOE systems
and thus delay their beneﬁts for patient safety. Rapid
adoption might not bring the intended beneﬁts, howev-
er, if actual use of the CPOE system undermines the
beneﬁts and introduces additional problems.
Bates suggests that our focus on perceptions of errors,
rather than on the actual errors, represents a major lim-
itation. Obviously, we would have liked to have had
both house oﬃcers perceptions of errors and the actual
errors. However, the criticism misses a key element of
our study: all 22 error types we identiﬁed were made
via observations and actual reports of the events by phy-
sicians. The doctors told us about the actual errors they
made, not only perceptions of error risks. The ‘‘per-
ceived error’’ data from the survey reﬂect only 9 of the
22 error types we discuss.
Bates argues we should have emphasized the advan-
tages of CPOE over paper-based systems and acknowl-
edged studies that discussed the weaknesses of CPOE.
In fact, we speciﬁcally noted 13 recent studies on
CPOEs error-reducing role along with decades of work
by human factors researchers [1]. Also, the article
repeatedly stressed the abundant literature on CPOEs
role in error reduction. We dispute neither those ﬁnd-
ings nor the fact that ‘‘our’’ CPOE system probably re-
duced many medication ordering errors. We suggested
only that there was another, usually ignored, side to
the story.
In the end, we agree with Bates that CPOE is proba-
bly better than paper-based systems, and that the task is
to improve CPOE and encourage its beneﬁcial use.
In Hiding in Plain Sight: What Koppel et al. Tell Us
about Healthcare IT, Nemeth and Cook focus on cogni-
tive engineering, which extends and expands our ﬁnd-
ings. As they point out, cognitive scientists and human
factors analysts noted the consistent failure of health-
care IT as long as 12 years ago [2,3]. That work of cog-
nitive scholars was not appropriately heeded. As we
noted previously: (1) Most of the research on CPOE
was conducted to show its advantages over paper-based
systems; (2) Almost all of the research was on reduction
of potential rather than actual ADEs [4–14]; (3) Many
studies focused on physician satisfaction, barriers to
acceptance, single outcomes, and very limited samples;
(4) Several studies combine CPOE and clinical decision
support systems, thus confounding the interpretation of
CPOEs eﬃcacy. To our list we now add: (1) Housestaﬀ
order almost all of the medications at a teaching hospi-
tal, but as transitory physicians in training, their diﬃcul-
ties with CPOE are easy to ignore; (2) Too little research
on CPOE has been conducted in the real muck of the
hospital ﬂoors where the problems are ‘‘hiding in plain
sight’’; and (3) Lack of interdisciplinary knowledge is
pandemic. Our research involved observations, shadow-
ing of housestaﬀ, nurses, and pharmacists, intensiveinterviews, and a large survey—almost exactly what Ne-
meth and Cook suggest for research on healthcare IT.
Our ﬁve recommendations in the JAMA article agree
with Nemeth and Cooks view that research must ‘‘guide
new IT development in ways that move beyond the pre-
sumptive fantasies over the potential beneﬁts of technol-
ogy, and surprise over its unforeseen circumstances.’’
Critics of our JAMA article [15–17] claimed their new
software was designed to speciﬁcally address the errors
we identiﬁed in our research on an older CPOE system.
This is an extraordinary claim, though, because much of
our research and all of our recommendations speak to
what Nemeth and Cook call the ‘‘unforeseen circum-
stances’’ that inevitably occur with new systems. Also,
new systems must work in many hospitals with a spec-
trum of other systems and must adapt to emerging
workplace processes. Thus, in accord with Nemeth
and Cooks point, we add that it is simply not possible
to design a perfectly working system a priori.
Nemeth andCook indicate that few outside the profes-
sion see the frantic eﬀorts by clinicians tomake healthcare
service appear as a smooth-running operation. But some-
times it takes the outsider to see the chaos and work-
arounds that seem so ‘‘natural’’ in normal operation. In
fact, we discussed the ‘‘medical ethos of problem solving’’
as obscuring error prone systems from hospital leaders.
Consistent with Nemeth and Cooks guidelines for
instituting healthcare IT, we were repeatedly quoted in
post-article interviews [18] suggesting that CPOE sys-
tems cause clinicians to ‘‘wrap themselves around the
software like pretzels rather than have the software re-
spond to the needs of good medical practice.’’ Software
must adapt to the needs of patients and the providers of
healthcare, not the other way around. Our research also
underscores Nemeth and Cooks call for (1) in situ and
intensive research, (2) constant review and analysis,
and (3) the need for hospitals and IT vendors to become
‘‘team players.’’
The one place we would disagree with Nemeth and
Cook is their call for healthcare managers to delay imple-
menting CPOE. We feel these programs are suﬃciently
promising, and there is no reason for delay. However, it
is important that these systems are then evaluated, and
modiﬁed in response to those evaluations, rather than
CPOE being seen as a one-time installation.
Horsky, Zhang, and Patel note, ‘‘Excessively hopeful
expectations may have also contributed to the recent
dismay over that systems less-than-perfect performance
record.’’ We agree. Their preferred analogy to hospital
service is the ‘‘ﬁreﬁghter brigade,’’ rather than the oft-
used ‘‘cockpit crew.’’ We would only add one element
to the analogy: many of the ﬁreﬁghters would still be
in training, i.e., interns and residents.
As Horsky and colleagues note, hospital physicians
need as clear a presentation of information as possible.
They ‘‘consider errors in human or machine perfor-
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ing patient safety is to understand and manage those er-
rors, and ‘‘develop adaptive systems’’ that anticipate,
prevent and respond to the errors. We fully agree.
Designers of healthcare information technology (HIT)
must be exquisitely sensitive to the non-linear, context-
dependent, fast communication-dependent, interrup-
tion-ﬁlled, uncertain, and collaborative nature of hospi-
tal clinical practice. That some HIT development has
occurred without this disciplinary input and wisdom is
deeply regrettable. CPOE systems will be central compo-
nents of healthcare systems. Their design, installation,
and upkeep must be undertaken with careful research
to guide development of systems that will respond to,
rather than retard, medical practice.References
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